# Security and Privacy Policy Bugs in Browser Engines

13<sup>th</sup> of February, 2024 PhD defense of Gertjan Franken

Microsoft Won't Fix Security Bypass		Google Chrome Bro Billions of Users to	Teams -	– Cross Site	
Vulnerability in Edg	je	h a High Severity	Scripting	(XSS) By	pass CSP
Update Google Chrome	Immediately to Patch	l a l light corres y	Firefox vulnerable to	o trivial CS	P bypass
Vulnerability Govern	ment warns of bugs i	n Google Chrome,	Microsoft CSP B Goog	lypass Vu e Chrome	Inerability in Discovered -
VE-2017-11863	ure Bypass Vulnerability		Almos Almos Almos Almos Almos Almos	st Every V Covered	Vebsite In The
CSP Bypass Vulnerability in Goo Discovered - Almost Every Web Was At Risk	ogle Chrome site In The World		Mozilla Firef Disclosure V	orcemei ox CSP li /ulnerab	nt nformation
Chromium bug allowed bypass on Android devie	SameSite cookie	JGS EVERYWHE	RE (W	CVE-2014 CVE-2014 Chrome	XSS bug took
Service, please: Mo flaw in Firefox	zilla fixes CSP by xecuting Scripts In S ade To CSP Bypass	pass afari Reader 2. Ex	5 years and an HTM ploiting CSP in uthentication 8	n Webk & Autho	kit to Break prization
Chromium site isolation range of attacks on br	on bypass allows wid owsers	e Apple patches vulnerabilities	s three exploited	l Safari	2





#### Web Standards



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 6265 Obsoletes: 2965 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721

A. Barth U.C. Berkeley April 2011

HTTP State Management Mechanism

#### Abstract

This document These header ( (called cookie stateful sess: cookies have r and privacy, 1 on the Internet

#### Content Security Policy Level 3 W3C Working Draft, 6 December 2023

on the Internet This document obsoletes REC 2965

#### **Self-defined Policies**

• No formal specification



Intelligent Tracking Prevention



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Everyt	hing there is online	about W3 is linked directly or indirectly to this document, including an <u>executi</u> ailing lists _ Policy _ November's W3 news _ Frequently Asked Questions				Pencil		
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Softwa	re Products	A list of W3 project components and their current state. (e.g. <u>Line Mode</u> ,X11 <u>NeXTStep</u> , <u>Servers</u> , <u>Tools</u> , <u>Mail robot</u> , <u>Library</u> )						
Techni	ical	Details of protocols, formats, program internals etc				Proiect	Lines of coo	le
Bibliog	<u>iraphy</u>	Paper documentation on W3 and references.				Android	14 0001	
People	2	A list of some people involved in the project.				Android	14,606K	
History	<u>!</u>	A summary of the history of the project.			0004	Firefox (Gecko)	28,049k	
How cr	an I help ?	If you would like to support the web			2024	Chromium (Blink)	28,528k	
Getting code		Getting the code by <u>anonymous FTP</u> , etc.				Linux kernel	34,412k	
								E





#### Security and privacy in EPUB reading systems

IEEE S&P '21 [Ch4: Reading Between the Lines]

# This Book Is Totally Safe 1st Edition

1.4 ★★☆☆☆ ~ 1,396 ratings

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## Web 101: cookies and requests





# **Cross-site tracking**







## Takeaways I

if cookies\_disabled(): request.exclude cookie()



On / off switch - conceptually simple

Just oversights? 🕃

 $\times$  1 year later: only a few complete fixes

Many policies are retroactively added



# \*10 – 100 features per release

if tracking\_protection\_enabled(): request.block() tabbrowser.tabs.length > 1) function testNormalBrowsing()

ThirdPartyCookies\_enabled,



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# Content Security Policy (CSP)

- Defense in-depth against content injection attacks (e.g., XSS) and clickjacking
  - Defined by website
  - Enforced by web browser
- "Living standard"











#### BugHog Automated lifecycle pinpointing

Support        chromium          Experiments       BTPC       CSP         BTPC       CSP       ServiceWorker       form-action         Evaluation range	Using not-allow-modals not-script-src-elem securityp  Evaluation settings	MongoDB at 172.22.5.102  olicyviolation strict-dynamic upgrade-insecure-requests  Start evaluation	<ul> <li>✓ PoCs of CSP bugs</li> <li>→ 75 unique bugs</li> </ul>
Lower version     Upper version       50     100       Only release revisions (coming soon)   or       Lower rev nb       Image: Communication of the second s	Browser automation       (i)         CLI automation       (i)         Search strategy       (i)         Binary sequence ()       (i)         Binary search (i)       (i)         Composite search (i)       (i)         Sequence limit (i)       (i)	Results ① C1001283	Delta with state of practice Fully containerized
Database collection         support_chromium         Browser configuration         Settings         Default         Block third-party cookies (beta)         Private browsing (beta)	<ul> <li>1000</li> <li>Reproduction id ()</li> <li>c1001283</li> <li>Number of parallel containers ()</li> <li>8</li> </ul>		<ul> <li>Dependencies managed</li> <li>Chromium v25 – latest</li> <li>Firefox v23 – latest</li> <li>Concurrency</li> </ul>

Extensions

# 1. Bug introducing revisions

- Half of all bugs are foundational
  - \$5000 bug lived under the radar for 8 years

Revision intention

- Modifications to CSP logic are likely to cause new bugs
- Non-security feature introductions
   can act as bypass
  - Fragmented enforcement logic may lead to oversights



# 2. Room for improvement for cross-browser bug sharing

- Current practice: Web Platform Tests (WPT)
  - Vendors push and pull regression tests to and from shared repo
- Cross-browser evaluation



web-platform-tests

Test suites for Web platform specs - including

/wpt

WHATWG, W3C, and others

# 3. Inconsistent bug handling can lead to premature disclosure



Still present in the latest release at the time of the evaluation



# Takeaways II



#### First longitudinal bug lifecycle analysis

- Based on empirical evidence
- Independent of developer labels



#### Bug handling and sharing

- Current practice leaves room for improvement
- Avoidable exposure

#### BugHog: open-source

- Researchers and browser vendors
- From policies to multi-stage attacks





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# Methodology











**Case studies** 

# **Apple Books**

→ persistent DOS
 → user information disclosure

# **EPUBReader**

 $\rightarrow$  universal XSS

## **Amazon Kindle**

 $\underbrace{\mathsf{amazon}}_{\mathsf{kindle}} \rightarrow \mathsf{information} \mathsf{ leaking}$ 



Capability (ab)use in the wild



YOU WOULDN'T DOWNLOAD A CAR BOOK

# Capability (ab)use in the wild

- Malicious EPUBs distributed through illegal channels
  - The Pirate Bay, 4shared
  - +/- 9,000 EPUBs

< 1% contained JavaScript (all benign)

# YOU WOULDN'T DOWNLOAD A C BOOK

Capability (ab)use in the wild



- Tracking EPUBs distributed
   through legal channels
  - Free e-books from the most popular EPUB vendors



No indications of tracking

# Are self-published EPUBs sufficiently sanitized?



Like, really, actually for nobody."





**BARNES**&NOBLE

## Takeaways III



Embedding browser engine in **native applications** 

**Insecure** configurations

Collaboration with W3C

Improvements to the standard

• Attack surface is **needlessly large** 

Integration into the official testbed

• **Responsible disclosure** for 37 reading systems



Inadequate sanitization of self-published e-books







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#### More features, more problems

Idealistic approach





+6%

#### Pragmatic approach

#### **CSP** in the Policy Container

Author: antoniosartori@chromium.org Date: 2020-11-10



Automation! Automation! Automation!

### Avoid exposure due to **bug handling** and **sharing issues**

• Standardized bug reporting language





In depth bug analysis: **BugHog**!



Avoid needlessly large attack surfaces of embedded browser engines

Modular browser engines



Transparency towards developers and users



# Security and Privacy Policy Bugs in Browser Engines

13<sup>th</sup> of February, 2024 PhD defense of Gertjan Franken